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This is the story of urban renewal planning in the DeSoto-Carr
neighborhood, a hard-core Negro slum in the St. Louis inner city. It
is also the story of two federally-financed programs, urban renewal and
Model Cities, whose differing guidelines and objectives clashed to
provide a confrontation between official and citizen planning in what
was certainly one of the first tests of the new citizen power in slum
neighborhoods. But we must begin our story-at least its citizen
participation part-as early as 1964. Although federal regulations had
previously mandated citizen participation in renewal programs, it was
with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964-the War
on Poverty-that citizen participation in the planning process became
an overriding concern in a federally-supported program. This dra-
matic change was signalled by the requirement that community action
programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maxi-
mum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members
served."' It was also in 1966 that Congress adopted the Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, more commonly known as
the Model Cities Act. As was true of the poverty program, the Act
was a tool by which to launch a broad scale attack to improve the
quality of urban life, and to uplift "persons of low income in older
urban areas."2 Unlike the poverty program, however, which contem-
* B.A., Hamilton College; J.D., Albany Law School; LL.M. in Urban Studies,
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2782(3) (Supp. 1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3301( Supp. 1969).
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plated an independent poverty agency, Model Cities mandated that
the local model city agency be within the local governmental struc-
ture.3 In what constitutes a statutory retreat from "maximum feasible
participation," Congress also required that one prerequisite for assist-
ance would be "widespread citizen participation" in the Model City
program.4
Although the Model Cities legislation represented a retreat from
the citizen participation requirement of the troubled poverty program,
administrative guidelines interpreting the legislation did not ade-
quately reflect the implicit change in Congressional policy. The basic
guideline for citizen participation formulated by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter referred to as HUD)
required the constructive involvement of citizens in model neighbor-
hoods and the city as a whole and the creation of a means to introduce
the views of area residents in policy making and to allow them to
participate actively in planning and implementing the demonstration
(Emphasis added.) HUD held that the requirement was an out-
growth of the conviction that improving the quality of life in model
neighborhoods "could be accomplished only by affirmative action of
the people themselves" (Emphasis added) .
Against the background of Congressional interest in effective citizen
participation in Model Cities, federal urban renewal legislation has
remained unchanged. It remained to HUD to formulate and require
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3312(2) (1966). In appearing before a Congressional sub-
committee, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert Weaver stated
that the proposed legislation required that programs would be subject to the
control of the local governing body. Hearings on H.R., 12341, H.R. 12946, H.R.
13064, H.R. 1256 Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1966). The sum-
mary of the Act stresses the importance of the role of the city and, although it
states that the demonstration programs must utilize private initiative and enterprise
"to the fullest possible extent," it is devoid of verbiage requiring "widespread citi-
zen participation" or "maximum feasible participation." House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, Summary, Analysis, Legislative History and Conference Report,
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 1-2 (1966).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3303(a)(2) (Supp. 1969).
5. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter cited
as HUD), Model Cities Administration, City Demonstration Letter #3, Oct. 30,
1967.
Legitimate questions can be raised as to the meaning of these terms. Both
the terms and the legislation within which they appear suggest a difference in ap-
proach. As has been postulated elsewhere, HUD's position on citizen participa-
tion is somewhat ambivalent.
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the growth of citizen inputs. In June of 1968, HUD required forma-
tion of Project Area Committees comprised of area residents for all
urban renewal projects which had projected residential redevelopment
and which were not yet in the execution stage.6 The only exception to
the creation of project committees was an urban renewal effort within
a Model City neighborhood, to which Model Cities guidelines were
to apply.
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN SAINT Louis
Both urban renewal and Model Cities guidelines were to be applied
to the DeSoto-Carr area in Saint Louis. Located adjacent to the cen-
tral business district and directly north of it, DeSoto-Carr has become
the focal point of attack upon urban problems financed by federally
aided programs-among them several employment projects, a com-
munity action program financed through the poverty program, an
expressway underwritten in part by federal aid, an urban renewal
project, and a Model Cities effort, the project boundary of which
includes the urban renewal site. DeSoto-Carr also contains a substan-
tial amount of federally-aided public housing.
Saint Louis itself is a core city of approximately 673,000 which has
suffered the loss of over 250,000 whites within the past twenty years
while experiencing a growth of non-white population from 154,000 in
1950 to 216,000 in 1960 to a projected 291,000 in 197.7 Further, in
the decade from 1953 to 1964, one-eighth of the manufacturing firms
vacated the city and 26,100 jobs disappeared. 8 Much of the exodus of
the whites and of industry can be attributed to widespread physical
deterioration which has accentuated the appeal of the suburbs that
Saint Louis is constitutionally precluded from annexing.9 The effects
of a physically deteriorated city upon its populace and the need to
undertake drastic renovation was evident to the city's planners as
early as 1942, at which time they isolated a collar of obsolete land users
surrounding the central business district. This collar embraced 7.4%,
of the city. A blighted area requiring extensive rehabilitation totaled
6. HUD, Local Planning Letter #458, June 24, 1968. The letter has since
been incorporated into the Urban Renewal Handbook at RHA 7217.1 Ch. 5,
Sec. 2 (Feb. 1969).
7. SAINT Louis CITY PLANNING COMM'N (hereinafter cited as PLAN Comm'N),
TECHNICAL REPORT ON BASIC INDICATORS at 2, 10-14 (Dec. 1968). One-tenth
of the non-white populous in-migrated in the 1950's, but the non-white increase
is due more to high birth rates than to migration. Id. at 12.
8. PLAN COMm'N, TECHNICAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POTEN-
TiALS 3, 6 (Dec. 1968).
9. Mo. CONST. ART. VI, § 30.
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27% of the city and surrounded this decadent collar.10 Since World
War H, much of the core area has undergone, or is in the process of
undergoing, urban renewal.
Another cornerstone of Saint Louis' redevelopment plans has been
to increase accessibility to the city's core.". A comprehensive plan in
1947 proposed three types of highways, expressways, distributors, and
radials, to meet this need.12 The radials were to connect the city core
and the outlyiiig areas while the north-south routes were to distribute
the traffic. Expressways were to allow access to the city as well as to
furnish a means to avoid the central city congestion. The solution
proposed in 1947 was challengeda but rebutted in 1951,"4 again
recommended in 1959,'r and officially made part of the "Major Streets"
map in 1961. As of 1969, all but one of the completed highways have
been financed as part of the federally-aided interstate system,10 in
which the federal government pays 90 per cent of construction costs.
Highway plans which have not received federal assistance have not
proceeded beyond the proposal state. Such is the status of the north-
west radial, whose eastern terminus is projected to pass through
DeSoto-Carr.'7
Federal funding also affected renewal efforts in DeSoto-Carr. Prior
to 1947, the only large-scale renewal effort in DeSoto-Carr had been
construction of a low-rise public housing complex financed under the
Housing Act of 1937.s As of 1947, the only available federal assistance
10. PLAN COMM'N, SAINT Louis AFTER WORLD WAR II 18 (1942).
11. PLAN COMM'N COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN FOR ST. Louis, vol. 1,
(1947); Interview with Ronald Neutzel, Acting Director of City Plan Comm'n,
Oct. 31, 1968.
12. COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN, supra note 11, at 35-38.
13. SAINT Louis URBAN AREA EXPRESSWAY REPORT PROJECT, EXPRESSWAY
PLAN FOR SAINT Louis AND ADJACENT bISSOURI AREA at 8-12, 17-34 (1951).
14. PLAN COMM'N., RELATIONSHIP OF THE SAINT Louis URBAN EXPRESSWAY
PLAN TO THE OFFICIAL MAJOR STREET PLAN (1952).
15. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, A HIGHWAY PLANNING STUDY
FOR THE SAINT Louis METROPOLITAN AREA, vol. 1 195-200 (1959).
16. The federal aid highway legislation is found at 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(1966). Ninety percent of the cost of the interstate system is payable by the fed-
eral government. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) (1966).
17. Although several attempts have been made to place the northwest radial
in the state system, budgetary restrictions have precluded its designation as a
route eligible for State and Federal aid. Interview with Thomas Dollus, State High-
way Commission Official, March 19, 1969.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1401, et seq. (1966).
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was for low-rent public housing, and a redevelopment proposal at the
time proposed rehousing in a series of low-rise apartments similar to
the public housing already existing. Commercial enterprises serving
the residents were to be located in planned shop clusters. 9
By the 1950's federal aid was available for redeveloping residential
slums with industrial uses. A study in 1953 suggested industrial rather
than residential uses in much of the area, and a city-wide Land Use
Plan in 1957 again projected industrial redevelopment. 20
Missouri's slum clearance law was passed in 1951, and a local land
clearance authority was created soon thereafter, to be referred to in
this discussion as LCA. Had urban renewal proceeded in 1957, the
LCA would quietly have gone ahead with plans for industrial rede-
velopment with little or no citizen involvement in renewal plans. But
renewal was delayed in the DeSoto-Carr area, and the legal framework
for renewal had changed.
H1. Ti PROJECT AREA IN 1968
In 1947, the DeSoto-Carr neighborhoods were predominantly resi-
dential and had approximately 5,000 dwellings. Fully sixty to seventy
per cent were without toilets.21 The neighborhoods were overwhelm-
ingly obsolete. Since that date, and most notably since 1960, the
present project area has suffered a rapid decline in population. In
1960, 3,036 units housed 7,767 people while only 1,383 people occupied
492 dwellings in 1968.22 Of the 3,036 occupied dwellings in 1960,
over ninety per cent were substandard.
23
In addition to the earlier low-rise housing project in the area, five
new, predominantly high-rise public housing projects were built in
the area at a cost of fifty-five million dollars between 1953 and 1957.24
Four of the projects were directly west of the urban renewal area and
the fifth was on the eastern boundary. 25 By 1960, the population in
19. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 11, at 28-30.
20. PLAN COMM'N, LAND USE PLAN at 31 (1956).
21. COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN, supra note 11.
22. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF METROPOLITAN SAINT Louis,
ACTION/HouSING DEP'T 22 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ACTION/HOUSING).
23. LAND CLEARANCE FOR REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT PLANNING ANALYSIS FOR DESOTo CARE URBAN RENEWAL AREA 35 (1968)
(hereinafter cited as HOFFMAN REPORT).
24. All of the public housing in St. Louis is concentrated in the "slum collar."
25. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY URBAN RESEARCH AND DESIGN CENTER, CHECK-
LIST OF SLUM CLEARANCE, PUBLIC HOUSING, URBAN RENEWAL, REHABILITATION
AND CONSERVATION PROJECTS IN THE ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL
AREA 5-6 (Nov. 7, 1966).
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the projects fostered a new set of problems, which, even without the
expansion of citizen participation, created complications in the plan-
ning and execution of a redevelopment program.
The presence of the projects has triggered a social deterioration in
the area and has created an adverse impression in the minds of the
general community so that it is thought to be, and is, a high crime,
low income, black ghetto. By 1967, the urban renewal area was be-
tween densely populated pockets of federally-aided housing projects.
18,400 people, sixty-eight per cent of whom were under age twenty-
one, lived in project housing households which had a median income
of $2,504. Sixty-three per cent of the households were without a male
head, fifty-eight per cent were receiving welfare and fully ninety-eight
per cent were non-white. 6 The social stigma of the housing projects
has resulted in increasing difficulties in obtaining tenants, high vacancy
rates, and several social problems which have become a national
scandal.27 The projects have also caused concern that attracting new
business and industry, which could aid in the solution of the social
problems of the area, would be more than usually difficult. By 1968
then, the planning for the redevelopment of the 374 acre tract,28
occupied by a random mixture of incompatible residential, commercial
and industrial users, would have to consider the needs and effects of
the surrounding negative social patterns.
III. AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE PROJECT AREA
Three other developments occurred between 1960 and 1968 which
directly affect planning for the area. All are direct offspring of federal
legislation. As a preliminary to detailed urban renewal planning,
federal legislation provides funding for a General Neighborhood
Renewal Plan (hereinafter GNRP) .9 The function of a GNRP is to
26. HOFFMAN REPORT, suprL note 24, at 40-42.
27. The average vacancy rate in 1960 was 10.7% while it was 17% in 1968.
In one project the vacancy rate is 26-30%. Hoffman Report, supra note 24, at
39. The rate is especially high as the need for low rent housing in Saint Louis
is extremely acute.
28. The uses in the present tract are as follows: 41.2% (154.2 acres) is de-
voted to streets and highways; 22.4% of the remainder to commercial (49.2
acres) ; 36.1% (79.4 acres) to industrial; 13.6% (29.9 acres) to off-street parking;
9.4% (20.8 acres) to public use; 8.7% (19.4 acres) to residential use and 9.8%
(21.6 acres) is vacant. Non-street uses comprise 58.8% of the land, so the project
has 220.3 net acres. HOFFMAN RIPORT, supra note 24, at 20.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(d) (1966).
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undertake preliminary planning of an area in need of urban renewal
but too large to be effectively redeveloped through but one urban
renewal project. The Federal government funded such a study for
Saint Louis in the early 1960's which covered the same area as the
present Model Cities target area. At that time the changing character
of the DeSoto-Carr area was reflected by GNRP proposals for an in-
crease in residential uses over what was recommended in the 1957 city
plan. Much of the residential redevelopment projected by the GNRP
study was high-rise public housing.30
A second major development was the passage of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, which has already been noted. Through
the funds made available by that Act, community organization in the
five housing projects and in the urban renewal area began to develop.
The poverty program in Saint Louis was and is managed through the
Saint Louis Human Development Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as HDC). HDC divided its target areas into districts, two of which
were within the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal area.31 HDC funded two
settlement houses in the Carr Central area as neighborhood stations.
32
When preliminary planning for urban renewal began, residents of the
urban renewal area sought the aid of a staff member in one of the
settlement houses to assist in organizing yet another citizens' body
which came to be the Can Central Tenement Improvement Associa-
tion. These people were exclusively from the urban renewal area.
33
This split in citizen organization between the public housing and
urban renewal areas was to continue to bedevil project planning.
Grass roots organizations therefore existed by the time Saint Louis
launched the Model City program in 1966. The approach of the
Model City agency was to look at the ghetto as possessing a series of
component "subsystem" problems. These subsystems corresponded to
the items listed as part of the comprehensive approach in the Congres-
sional Act itself-housing, employment, welfare, education, health,
30. Interview with Albert Nerviani, DeSoto-Carr Urban Renewal Project Di-
rector, March 13, 1969.
31. Carr Central is in the eastern portion of the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal
area; the second HDC district is named Pruitt-Igoe and includes the western
portion of the urban renewal site.
32. All references to Carr-Central, Pruitt-Igoe or the neighborhood refer to
HDC-Model Cities groups: all references to DeSoto-Carr refer to LCA and
the urban renewal project.
33. ACTzoN/HousINO, supra note 23, at 19-21. Interview with Rev. Buck Jones,
Staff Member of Plymouth House, Nov. 13, 1968.
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crime and delinquency, recreation, culture and transportation."' The
concept was that there were either insufficient programs in the neigh-
borhood or misdirected ones. Once these inadequacies could be
isolated, new programs could be designed to "fill the gaps." By chang-
ing programs or introducing new ones, and then assessing their effects
on the system of the ghetto through deductive theory, the area could
be uplifted. The Model City Agency thus saw itself as a planning
agency and a tool for coordinating and improving upon the disparate
programs then available to ghetto residents.33
The target area for the Model City effort originally encompassed
much of the northern half of the city, but was reduced in area to
form a semi-circle around the central business district roughly similar
to the slum collar first identified in 1942. This target area was later
reduced at the behest of the federal government to include 70,000
people on the north side of the central business district where it was
felt the worst social conditions existed.36 Because of the geographic
and demographic scale of the target area and an overriding desire to
achieve a high citizen input, the target area was next divided into five
"sub-cities" or "sub-neighborhoods."
HUD's performance standards for citizen participation required
that an organizational structure be formed which would embody
neighborhood residents and be led by a person whom the neighbor-
hood would accept as representing their interests. In the same letter
that outlined citizen participation for Model City efforts, HUD man-
dated that the citizen structure
"... have clear and direct access to the decision making process
of the City Demonstration Agency so that neighborhood views
can influence policy planning and program decisions" (emphasis
added) .37
In promulgating performance standards then, HUD did imply citizens
were to have power, but the question of whether they would control
programs is unanswered.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3301 (1969 Supp.).
35. B. Phegan, The Development of the Saint Louis Model City Agency from
June 1966 to April 1967, 6-9, 1968 (unpublished thesis in the Washington Uni-
versity Art and Architectural Library).
36. Interview with Samuel Dardick, former Chief Planner of Saint Louis Model
City Agency, March 12, 1969.
37. City Demonstration Letter #3, supra note 5.
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As stated, the boundaries of the Model Cities neighborhoods were
to be divided by five, the better to achieve a high citizen input.
Although this objective was achieved, the effect of the sub-city system
was to inhibit the growth of an organized and comprehensive plan and
to pit one sub-neighborhood against another. The end result was the
creation of five Model City plans rather than one.
Integration of the five sub-neighborhood plans was to occur through
a "floating" sub-city team acting as a liaison among the five sub-
neighborhood groups. Integration of the Model City effort with other
agencies was the responsibility of the "sub-system" planning commit-
tee, which was to achieve and maintain contact with agencies which
were or should be operating in the target area. These integrative steps
were not to occur and planning in the sub-cities was to proceed with-
out the coordination necessary to evolve one complete and related
program.
Within each of the five neighborhoods, the Model Cities agency
planned to recognize an indigenous group which was or could become
representative of the entire sub-neighborhood. Once a group received
recognition, it was to form a non-profit corporation, after which both
HDC and the Model Cities agencies were to orient their activities to
and through the recognized corporation.38
Model Cities recognized two groups in the DeSoto-Carr urban
renewal area. One was the group which had been nurtured by the
HDC from a group of tenant councils into a neighborhood advisory
council. Upon Model City recognition, it formed the Carr Central
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Carr Central). A similar
corporation, another outgrowth of HDC activity, was formed in Pruitt-
Igoe. The former occupied much of the urban renewal area while the
latter represented the people in the western sector of DeSoto-Carr.
The Carr Central Tenement Improvement Association was not recog-
nized, evidently as it did not have the necessary neighborhood support.
Admittedly, Model Cities did give consideration to conforming
neighborhood boundaries with that of the pre-existing urban renewal
area. At one time, the Model City and urban renewal boundaries did
coincide.s 9 However, the conviction that high citizen input was rela-
38. Saint Louis City Demonstration Agency, Citizen Participation, 3 (January
12, 1968) (hereinafter cited as Citizen Participation).
39. HDC, Research and Planning Document #5, Neighborhood Handbook
for Human Development Corporation Carr Central District and Model Cities'
DeSoto Carr Subcity, at d (March 1968) (hereinafter referred to as Neighborhood
Handbook).
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tively more important than agency relationships dictated a change in
boundaries by Model Cities to align the Model City sub-neighborhoods
with HDC districts. The people in DeSoto-Carr were drawn to two
different HDC districts, Pruitt-Igoe or Carr Central. The people in
the eastern portion demonstrated a distinct lack of appreciation for
the problems of Pruitt-Igoe and felt their troubles related more to a
physically deteriorated neighborhood than to the inadequacies of high-
rise public housing. Hence, the decision to align Model Cities sub-
neighborhoods with HDC districts was deemed rationalized.
Assuming that the Model Cities sub-city approach was necessary to
achieve citizen participation, 0 the decision to change the boundaries
of the Can Central and Pruitt-Igoe sub-cities is questionable. The
decision to change heightened the fragmentation of the citizen partici-
pation structures and increased inward tendencies. It at once high-
lights the good working relationship between the Model Cities and
HDC agencies while documenting that Model Cities was not relating
well to other agencies working in the general neighborhood.
IV. THE 1968 DEVELOPMENTS
During 1968, several additional changes in the legal requirements
occurred. One was HUD's issuance of new citizen participation re-
quirements for urban renewal projects, which have been mentioned
earlier. In April of 1968, HUD's Model Cities Administrator informed
the local Model City Agency that urban renewal programs in model
neighborhoods would be subject to Model City guides as well as urban
renewal requirements. In any final application for an urban renewal
project within a Model City neighborhood, HUD would require the
city's Mayor, as head of the City Demonstration Agency, to submit a
letter stating that urban renewal and Model City plans were coordi-
nated and that the urban renewal application had been reviewed by
the citizens.41
In August of 1968, Congress passed the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act which included what was to become an important legal tool
in the land use planning for DeSoto-Carr. The new legislation created
the concept of a Neighborhood Development Program (hereinafter
referred to as NDP) . NDP is designed to facilitate more rapid renewal
40. Model Cities at first experienced trouble in involving citizens in the neigh-
borhoods.
41. Letter from George Parker to City Demonstration Agencies, Apr. 19, 1968.
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and allow the development of urban renewal areas on a more effective
scale. It is designed to be more flexible than the standard urban
renewal project. The standard project is planned and funded as one
unit; NDP is to be funded in annual increments with the federal
government having the right to terminate at the end of any year.
2
Moreover, more generalized planning standards and criteria have been
substituted in NDP for the specific and detailed restrictions and maps
which have often typified urban renewal projects. Physical planning
will progress from the general to the specific only as development
potential and conditions warrant. 3
NDP regulations outline citizen participation requirements for
Project Area Committees in Model Cities neighborhoods. 44 The NDP
Handbook states that where the boundaries of an NDP are con-
tained within a model neighborhood, the Model City citizen compo-
nent should represent the citizens of the urban renewal area. Where
the boundaries of an urban renewal area and a model city neighbor-
hood partially coincide, the Model City component should represent
the residents of the Model City area and should coordinate its activities
with the Project Area Committee (hereinafter referred to as PAC)
for the rest of the area. PAC are "to participate in the detailed plan-
ning and execution of the activities within the area" and be an integral
part of the decision making process regarding the timing and the loca-
tion of all activities within the project area.4 5
Although NDP was not to be adopted in the DeSoto-Carr project
until November of 1968, LCA felt that it needed a citizen advisory
group before that time. In late August, Carr Central approached
LCA and requested that it function as the advisory group for the
urban renewal project. Stating that it was representative of the citi-
zens and the business communities in the area, Carr Central held that
it met the legal requirements of federal regulations and it offered to
42. CCH URBAN AFFAmS REPORTER, 11, 373-76.
43. HUD, NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HANDBOOK, RHA
7384.1, Ch. 1, § 1 (1968).
44. Id. at RHA 7387.1, Ch. 1, § 2. The NDP HANDBOOK states that
where the boundaries of an NDP are contained within a model neighborhood,
the Model City citizen component should represent the citizens of the urban
renewal area. Where the boundaries of an urban renewal area and a Model City
neighborhood partially coincide, the model city component should represent the
residents of the Model City area and should coordinate its activities with the
PAC for the rest of the area.
45. Id.
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establish a PAC working committee to participate in LCA's planning
activities.-
Carr Central was not, however, representative of all segments of
the urban renewal area. Carr Central's governing board as well as
most of its members were residents of the public housing which was
outside the urban renewal site. The governing board itself was re-
stricted to residents of the projects. Because of the boundary decision
for Model Cities, Car Central did not have any participants in the
western area of DeSoto-Carr.47 Nor had there been any interplay be-
tween the corporation and any commercial or industrial businessmen
in DeSoto-Carr.48 Further, the Corporation was not the only citizen
group in the area; the Carr Central Tenement Improvement Associa-
tion also existed. The Association's membership was not only smaller
than that of the corporation but was exclusively from the renewal
project area. One did not reflect the wishes of the predominant popu-
lation centers in the general area; the other did not adequately
encompass the people in the projects. The ill-aligned borders were
beginning to become important.
On the basis that Carr Central more adequately represented the
majority of people in the area,' 9 LCA granted Can Central's request
but stipulated that Can Central must recruit local businessmen to
serve on the PAC which Carn Central was to establish.5 ; Because of
'Carn Central's inadequate representation of all segments of the popu-
lace, the corporation took several months to staff the PAC. By No-
vember though, all of the required citizen components had been
created.
V. SPEcIFic LAND USE PLANNING FOR DESOTO-CARR-CARR CENTRAL
A. The Neighborhood Plan
By April of 1968, Model Cities had recognized and contracted with
Carr Central, providing the new corporation with funds with which
to rent a neighborhood office and to begin planning a program. With
the aid of the former planner for Model Cities, who was awarded a
46. Letter from Emma Hall, Chairman of Carr-Central, to Albert Nerviani,
Aug. 29, 1969.
47. Letter from Arthur Hessel, LCA Counsel, to Albert Nerviani, Aug. 29,
1968.
48. Interview with Emma Hall, Oct. 25, 1968.
49. The Tenement Improvement Association had not been and has not become
a major neighborhood force.
50. Letter from Albert Nerviani to Emma Hall, Sept. 16, 1968.
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technical assistance contract by Can Central, the citizens spent long
hours working at a heavy pace to frame both one-year and five-year
goals. The structure of the effort was the sub-system, and concentrated
upon physical development, health, education, welfare, employment,
recreation and culture. The final proposal ranked the proposed pro-
grams and their relationship with each other.
This sub-city planning effort in Carn Central was characterized by
several phenomena. One was the neighborhood's deep distrust of the
LCA, as the people were positive that LCA had a plan in esse which
did not agree with their desires. Another was that the planning effort
followed instructions issued by Model Cities. Following its tenet of
high citizen input, Model Cities told Car Central to dream and to
"plan big" as the final plans would have to allow for tradeoffs or
compromises with other agencies. Notably, the sub-neighborhood
would determine the nature and extent of the tradeoffs they would
accept.
By July, 1968, Carn Central had completed its task. The product of
its work was a well-documented series of proposals expressing the
neighborhood's analysis of what it needed to improve itself. One of
the most important products of the neighborhood's work was a series
of maps illustrating present building conditions and existing land uses
as well as proposed circulation patterns and redevelopment proposals.
The main theme of the proposal was the linkage of residential uses
and uses related to residential needs through creation of a corridor of
public and residential users running east-west between the housing
projects bordering DeSoto-Carr. Thus, the present splitting of resi-
dential uses by unrelated commercial and industrial uses would be
removed and replaced by new housing and a core of community
facilities such as day care and health centers, neighborhood shop com-
plexes and community schools. Proposed circulation patterns would
deter traffic from using area roads as "through" streets and would
separate the commercial and industrial traffic from the residential. To
accomplish this, all but two of the north-south streets were either to
end in cul-de-sacs or be eliminated in part so as to function only as
local roads. Only one east-west street was to bisect the neighborhood.
To alleviate the adverse social conditions of high-rise public housing,
Carr Central envisioned construction of 4,050 individually-owned
housing units on 127 acres and renovation of the high rises to elimi-
nate dwelling units above the sixth floor. The first-year goal was to
begin construction on 250 housing units. At the end of the five-year
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plan, the neighborhood would have a total of 6,000 housing units
sheltering 13,000 people. Approximate cost of the physical redevelop-
ment was $69,500,000.51
B. Agency Reaction and Background
Carr Central submitted its plan to Model Cities on the first of
August. Model Cities in turn requested that LCA evaluate the pro-
posal before it was submitted for approval to the city's Board of
Aldermen. LCA felt that neither the Carr Central nor any of the other
four sub-city plans could be reviewed upon such short notice. Further-
more, LCA held that its review of the Carr Central plan must consider
the results of survey and planning studies contracted by LCA and then
underway for the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal project. 2
The Model Cities request and the reaction of LCA reveal the exist-
ence of several related problems. In the beginning days of Model
Cities, the Model City agency budget was severely limited. It had
then held preliminary discussions with LCA to explore the possibility
that some of LCA's planning money be diverted to the then-proposed
neighborhood efforts.5 3 Due to differences in the planning required
of the two agencies by the Federal government, LCA did not feel that
it could abide by the request. Planning for Model Cities was to con-
centrate upon identifying and analyzing the physical, social and eco-
nomic problems of its ghetto target area and then describing an over-
all strategy to overcome each identified problem. This planning was
to be based upon readily ascertainable data and was to be the basis
for proposals to alleviate the adverse conditions of the ghetto and
to coordinate agency operations.5 4 Urban renewal regulations, how-
ever, required surveys by professional appraisers and consultants.
Land utilization and marketability studies as well as reuse appraisals
and a preliminary plat must be submitted with urban renewal fund-
ing applications. 55 If LCA complied with the Model Cities request, it
felt it would not have the funds necessary to execute its own plans for
the area.
51. All data are directly from the Carr-Central Corporation Model City Plan
as originally submitted to Saint Louis Model City Agency on Aug. 1, 1968.
52. Letter from Irvin Dagen, LCA Executive Director, to Margaret Wilson,
Acting Director of Model Cities, Aug. 12, 1968.
53. Citizen Participation, supra note 38, at 4.
54. HUD, City Demonstration Letter #1, §§ 2-3 (Oct. 30, 1967).
55. HUD, Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7214.1, Oh. 2, §§ 1-2 (Feb.
1968).
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Because of the LCA studies in DeSoto-Carr, it had been informally
agreed that specific physical redevelopment proposals by Model Cities
would not be formulated pending the completion of LCA studies.58
Hence, the LCA was disturbed by the comprehensive nature of Carr
Central's proposals, especially as none of the other four sub-city
proposals were as detailed. LCA felt that its tasks were being usurped
and it made its objections known, provoking the acting director of
Model Cities to retort that urban renewal programs as they are gener-
ally conducted do not consider the desires of the residents.57
The controversy highlighted two points. HUD had not yet required
LCA to form a Project Area Committee, and LCA had not yet formally
chosen its citizen component. Secondly, Model Cities guidelines on
allowable planning posited that Model City's planning process was
not to be a program of basic research. The only physical planning
which Model Cities' citizen groups could undertake was that which
would allow the city to initiate detailed project planning. The guide
specifically stated that "only the general location of community facili-
ties" short of "definitive determination of physical treatment or size
or location" was allowable. Model Cities was not to engage in projects
and activities which could be financed through federal grant-in-aid
programs such as urban renewal. 58
Although unsuitable for LCA submission to HUD, preparation of
Carr Central's detailed maps consumed much time and effort by the
residents. The neighborhood was unaware of HUD's Model City
guideline, but the Model City agency was charged to know and follow
it. By circumventing the guideline, the agency chronicled that it had
become more of an advocate for the sub-neighborhood than an agency
responsible for coordination and creation of programs designed to
assist and meet the needs of the residents. One casual factor in this
subtle change in emphasis could be that the Model City agency had
lost its director midway in the planning efforts of the neighborhoods
after losing both its systems analyst and its chief planner. Thus, Model
Cities had lost the part of the staff which had charged itself with co-
ordinating sub-city plans, sub-system needs and on-going and proposed
agency plans. Another could have been the Model City director's
56. Letter from Irvin Dagen to Margaret Wilson, supra note 53.
57. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Aug. 13, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1.
58. HUD, City Demonstration Letter #2 at 12 (Nov. 30, 1967).
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penchant to stress citizen power to such an extent that citizens felt
they were to control the Model City program."9
C. LCA Plans
Shortly after the five sub-city plans were submitted to and approved
by the city's Board of Aldermen, LCA began to receive interim reports
from its contractual consultants, who had been working in the project
area since the beginning of the year. Most important of these reports
was a land use and marketability survey. The preliminary recom-
mendations of the land use report reflected the increasing influence of
the physical and social changes in the area first noted in the GNRP
study. The report reflected a further need to expand residential uses
beyond the GNR1P proposals,80 and also supported LCA conclusions
that the people in the public housing projects related to residential
areas north and west of DeSoto-Carr rather than to the area to the east.
LCA's unofficial reaction to the Carr Central plan was one of cau-
tious dismay. It foresaw the possibility of a future population of
18,000 in the housing alone (21 children per unit 4,000 units) plus
the continuance of approximately 18,000 public housing dwellers-or
36,000 people on the four hundred fifty plus acres of the project area
and the adjacent public housing. If the ratio of black to white popula-
tion remained stable, LCA felt that to follow Carr Central's plans
would result only in increasing the size and the depth of the ghetto
problem.61 LCA had to work within a HUD directive that projects
should strive toward reducing excessive concentrations of minority
group families. 62
59. The former director stated in 1969 that several myths had attached them-
selves to citizen participation. One was that decision making should be reserved
unto those that suffer; the second, that institutions which deliver services to the
ghetto should he controlled by ghetto residents. The director stated that he at
one time had taken these assumptions to be correct and admitted he had aided
in spreading what he termed "false doctrines." See Bourgeois and Sher, The Battle
Over Control of Schools; Community Demands and Educational Policy, Mill Creek
Intelligencer Feb. 1969 at 11.
60. LCA Interim Economic Development Planning Analysis Report for DeSoto-
Carr Urban Renewal Area at 111-25 (August 1968) (hereinafter cited as Hoffman
Interim Report).
61. The average household size in the public housing was 4.65. Hoffman In-
terim Report, supra note 60, at 111-21. DeSoto-Carr populace was estimated to
be at least 75% black in 1965. Neighborhood Handbook, supra note 39, at 6.
The 1968 public housing populace was almost exclusively black. Hoffman Report,
supra note 23, at 40.
62. HUD, Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA § 7207.1. (February 1968).
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Aside from the potential consequences of intense residential re-
development, LCA also surmised that the depth of the areas devoted
to commercial uses by Carr Central, exclusive of the southeast quad-
rant, were too shallow to be economically viable. The Carr Central
plan for the southwestern border envisioned commercial development,
but the depth of the land would allow for little more than strip de-
velopment. LCA would have preferred tracts large enough to accom-
modate a commercial center with adjacent off-street parking.
LCA was also aware of other possibilities and constraints in rede-
velopment. A rail spur bisected the area from north to south and an
east-west industrial steam line served the project area. Both of these
assets would be helpful in luring industrial reusers. Furthermore,
substantial redevelopment was projected to the east of DeSoto-Carr
in an area called Ladede's Landing. LCA and its economic consult-
ants felt that any realistic plans for DeSoto-Carr and the economic re-
uses possible would depend in part upon developments in Laclede's
Landing.83
Results of an independent economic survey contracted by the City
Plan Commission under a Community Renewal Program grant from
HUD64 substantiated LCA's desires to encourage industrial develop-
ment. Citing that urban renewal projects devoted in part to industrial
reuse had contributed significantly to the maintenance and preserva-
tion of the city's industrial base and likely had prevented serious eco-
nomic losses, the report indicated that the city would need an addi-
To complicate the plight of LCA planning, the HouSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MiNT ACT of 1968 mandates that one half of all new units in residential projects
be for low or moderate income families. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. 1969).
63. Laclede's Landing is a twenty-two acre tract east of DeSoto-Carr and ad-
jacent to the Mississippi River. The projected private redevelopment under the
Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law (Mo. ANN. STAT. ch. 353)
will be a mixture of residential, commercial and tourist facilities.
64. The purpose of the Community Renewal Program is to chart the long range
program for urban renewal. The program is to be based upon an intensive study
of community needs and is a statement of specific actions to meet these needs.
Important characteristics of the program are: (1) its comprehensive and com-
munity wide nature; (2) its consideration of both immediate and long range needs
and resources of the community; (3) its recognition of the importance of social
and economic factors in renewal programming and (4) its continuing nature.
CCH, supra note 42, at 11,788 and 3571.
The statute states that a program may include, without being limited to, (1)
identification of slums, blighted or deteriorating areas (2) measurement of blight
(3) determination of resources needed and available to renew such areas (4)
identification of potential project areas (5) scheduling of urban renewal activities.
The grant is available only to the local plan commission. 42 U.S.C. § 1453(d)
(Supp. 1969).
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tional 590 acres for industry by 1975 . 5 DeSoto-Carr represented one
of the last areas in the city suitable for industrial redevelopment. If
there was one concern the Mayor's office had stressed, it was the neces-
sity of improving the city's economic base.
LCA was working under one other constraint in its pursuit of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan for DeSoto-Carr. Officially mapped
in 1961 and included in the GNRP land use projection was the
proposed eastern leg of the northwest radial highway, noted above.
HUD directives mandated that LCA consider the location of related
major highways in determining proposed land uses and traffic patterns
in urban renewal areas. Preparation of a definitive plan should not
proceed when the location of a major highway affecting the area has
not been determined.66 This directive implied that LCA had to in-
dude the northwest radial, hereinafter referred to as the Cole Street
Expressway, within its land use plan. The expressway was a route that
the Carr Central plan did not include.
D. LCA and the Project Area Committee
The divergence in thinking between LCA and Carr Central could
not be much greater. Although LCA did not have a land use proposal
at the time PAC meetings began, resident members of PAC were
convinced that it did and they were determined to defeat industrial
redevelopment. The prognosis for constructive cooperation between
the two entities was poor, even though each needed the other to
realize any redevelopment at all.
The first working meeting of PAC then, was marked by distrust of
the LCA by the residents and an LCA staff pessimistic of reaching any
agreement with the locality's representatives. After an initial skirmish
over inadequate representation of black businessmen-which led Carr
Central to appoint a larger committee than the one it first created-
it was agreed that the group was to function not as advocates but as
synthesizers of ideas and recommenders of preference. PAC was to
continue throughout the life of the project's execution and would be
65. Industrial Development Potentials, supra note 9, at 54, 59, 67-8.
66. HUD, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RIA 7207.1 (Nov. 1968). The
Handbook requires that the project plans not conflict with state or federally aided
highways. The Feb. 1968 edition required that urban renewal plans be coordinated
with all highway plans. The Cole Street Expressway is neither a state nor a
federal route.
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consulted in the selection of redevelopers. Possession of the veto by
the residents was not explicitly recognized. In fact, PAC representa-
tives were informed by HUD regional officials at a later DeSoto-Carr
Mid-Planning Conference that their role was advisory only.
The principal concerns of the residents, in order of priority, were
those of housing and related facilities, continuation of business enter-
prises now located in the area (especially those which employed black
residents) and attraction of industry which would provide jobs for
the area's residents.
Concerning housing and related facilities, the residents' biggest
worry was that adequate supporting facilities such as schools would
not be available at the time the housing was to be occupied. The
residents had had previous experience with the opening of several
public housing projects at a time when the schools were inadequate
for the increased demand placed upon them by new residents. The
residents therefore believed there was little cooperation between LCA
and the local school system.67 They also noted that an overload of
students already existed in the area's schools and that a new school
was needed to handle the area's populace.
Although the school system was aware of the area's needs-as evi-
denced by its ownership of several tracts in the neighborhood for
school sites-the system lacked the funds with which to build. Rather
than lack of cooperation, the problem of the schools was lack of re-
sources.6 8 The school problem had also been noted by Model Cities.
Perceiving the plight of the school system, the Model City staff had
not even approached the school authorities, but decided to seek the
monies through the device of supplementary funding. Supplementary
funding is a provision in the Model Cities legislation whereby money
can be used to fund projects and activities ineligible for assistance
under federal or state programs, or, secondly, to fund the city's share
of a Federal grant-in-aid program.
67. LCA and the housing authority in St. Louis have a common executive
director.
68. The school problem had also been noted by Model Cities. Perceiving the
plight of the school system, the Model City staff had not even approached the
school authorities, but decided to seek the monies through the device of supplemen-
tary funding. Interview with B. A. Kleindeinst, Chief Planner of Model Cities,
Feb. 26, 1969. Supplementary funding is a provision in the Model Cities legisla-
tion whereby money can be used to fund projects and activities ineligible for
assistance under federal or state programs, or secondly, to fund the city's share of
a federal grant-in-aid program. See CITY DEMONSTRATION LETTER No. 1, supra
note 54, at 5.4.
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On the housing itself, both PAC and the LCA achieved general
agreement on the desirability of residential development in the north-
west quadrant and of low-rise housing units. 0 PAC desired owner-
occupied dwellings rather than public housing. 0 PAC and LCA also
agreed that the southeast quadrant adjacent to the central business
district should be devoted to expansion of the downtown area. Before
the final meeting in which approval of the land use plan was scheduled,
PAC and LCA had preliminarily agreed that 75% of the area's build-
ings were to be razed and that, of the three hundred and seventy acres
in the tract, approximately forty-eight acres would be restricted to
residential usage. Much of the area would continue to be industrial
or commercial. LCA would strive to attract labor intensive industry
to DeSoto-Carr. The projected land use plan was ready for final PAC
approval.
E. The Land Use Proposals: Controversy
Approval, at least so easily, was not to be obtained, for the proposal
did not contain the Cole Street Expressway. LCA had known that the
proposed roadway would create problems in its planning efforts. In
June of 1968, LCA requested the City Plan Commission to reevaluate
its position on the alignment of the Cole Street Expressway. LCA
suggested realignment to the north of DeSoto-Carr.71 On the basis of
plans first formulated in 1961 and deemed to be controlling, the Plan
Commission rejected the LCA proposal. To the Commission, solving
downtown congestion was a prime necessity. Construction of the
thoroughfare would complete the northern arm of the long-sought
expresway loop designed to facilitate access to the core and to encour-
age the growth of parking facilities along the fringes of that core. The
roadway would act as a buffer between the industrial and commercial
land south of its projected right of way and the present public housing
to the north. These housing areas would more easily relate to resi-
dential areas north and west of DeSoto-Carr than if the roadway were
built where LCA suggested. If the northern alternative were adopted,
69. Except in elderly housing, high-rise elevator projects are now prohibited
unless there is no alternative. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(11) (Supp. 1969).
70. LCA's economic consultant also urged that no public housing be built in
the DeSoto Carr. HOFFMAN REPORT, supra note 23, at 54.
71. Letter from Albert Nerviani to City Plan Commission, June 3, 1968.
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traffic patterns around the housing projects would cause increased
danger to project residents.72
Concern for the future site of the expressway was to remain of much
concern to the Plan Commission and, even through mid-October, the
Commission held that the only reason it should be concerned with
DeSoto-Carr was that the plans must include the projected expressway.
One of the many problems besetting the city planning effort in Saint
Louis has been the decentralized nature of the myriad attempts to
attack urban deterioration, complicated by a high staff turnover in
both the Plan Commission and the Model City agency. The Plan
Commission's directorship had been occupied by three people within
the year preceding the appointment of a new director in September
of 1968. With the appointment of a new director, though, an attempt
was made to alleviate the disoriented planning among the various
city agencies. The new director was to assume broader responsibilities
than those of his predecessors in that, in addition to heading the Plan
Commission staff, he was to coordinate urban renewal, housing en-
forcement and Model City efforts. 3 Within a short time of his arrival,
the Plan Commission shifted its orientation from downtown and be-
gan to aid the Model City agency, which had just received HUD's first
rejection of its plan. 4 It was one of the director's first policy shifts and
was characterized as a morally, if not politically, correct decision.
The new director soon became aware of the thorny renewal question
in DeSoto-Carr and its related highway controversy. Exploratory
72. Letter from City Plan Commission to Irvin Dagen, July 24, 1968.
73. Interview with Norman Murdoch, City Plan Commission Director, Dec. 6,
1968.
74. The original Model City submission was rejected as it lacked coordination
both within itself and with plans of other agencies operating in the area. St. Louis
Pot-Dispatch, Oct. 19, 1968, § A, at 3, col. 1. Model Cities responded by
compiling the five sub-city proposals into one. This was again rejected by HUD.
At this time, HUD had the same objections, but also stressed that the city had
an overwhelming responsibility "to administratively manage the program so as to
amure the efficient and economical use of grant funds." Letter from Floyd Hyde,
Asn't Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations, to Mayor Cervantes,
Mar. 7, 1969. HUD questioned whether the existing city agencies had made any
substantial commitment to the Model City program; a chronic problem with the
Saint Louis Model City effort was "chronic and persistent" use of "tenuous and
confusing machinery coupled to no semblance of a system which will avoid duplica-
tion or proliferation" of administrative bodies and programs. Letter from G. A.
Parker, Ass't Regional Administrator for Model Cities, to Mayor Cervantes, Mar.
24, 1969. HUD held that personal involvement of the chief executive of the city
is necessary to achieve the desired levels of comprehensiveness and coordination.
Letter from Floyd Hyde to Mayor Cervantes, Mar. 19, 1969.
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meetings were held between the Plan Commission and Model Cities
staffs at which the alternatives were agreed to be three. One was to
demap, which was rejected as it had been attempted before and been
rejected by the Plan Commissioners. The second was to remap and
place the highway corridor north of DeSoto-Carr. Model Cities was
opposed; it would not only move the situs of the controversy northward
but would create difficult engineering problems in the construction
of interchanges with the North-South Distributor and the interstate
highway to the east. The third alternative allowed more promise.
An elevated structure with stores and community facilities beneath or
a depressed route overlain by plazas presented flexible design alter-
natives. Of the two, the depressed route would present knotty prob-
lems as both rail spurs and sewer connections interspersed the area.
The elevated expressway would also present engineering problems to
the east. The whole highway question was also under review by the
regional planning organization, the East-West Gateway Council, but
its studies would not be finished until the spring of 1969.7r With the
data then available though, the Council director's professional opinion
was that the highway was necessary.
To settle the highway controversy, the City Plan director arranged
meetings with representatives from Carr Central.7O In one heated
conference, the dispute threatened to subvert all planning for the area.
As the purpose of the meetings became known to the residents, their
resentment polarized. People in the neighborhoods felt they would
be severed from the rest of the city and that the highway was meant
to benefit not them but commuters from the suburbs. Suggestions that
neither Model Cities nor urban renewal submissions would be funded
without neighborhood approval of the highway failed to assuage the
residents. The furthest that some, but not all, of the residents would
compromise would be the elevated redesign or a realignment of the
right of way southward toward the central core.77 The realignment
would have placed the highway at the southern border of the neigh-
borhood, adjacent to the parking garages built or planned on the
75. A continuing and comprehensive transportation planning process is required
in urban areas of over 50,000 to enable that area to receive federal highway aid.
23 U.S.C. § 134. (1966).
76. Carr-Central had not included the Cole Street route in its plans because
it felt it had the power to decide if the route would be built through its neighbor-
hood. Model Cities reputedly had not informed Carr Central of the necessity of
inclusion.
77. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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core's fringe. As high-rise buildings and parking facilities would front
directly upon the southern edge of the realigned thoroughfare, the
proposal would present insurmountable problems in arranging inter-
changes with existing streets if it were ever carried to execution.
LCA had meanwhile taken its search for a solution to the State
Highway Commission. The State agency informed LCA that the
highway commission was overextended, that it would be unable to
provide funding within the foreseeable future of ten to fifteen years,
and that its plans for the DeSoto-Carr site were restricted to construc-
tion of the North-South Distributor to the east. At any rate, the Com-
mission felt that the Cole Street link would not be an integral part
of its highway system although the highway west of the North-South
Distributor (the radial to the suburbs) would become so.7 s The Com-
mission did recommend that LCA reserve a belt of one hundred and
twenty feet running east-west through the project for possible future
use. Interestingly, the Commission's plans for the North-South Dis-
tributor included a major interchange with Cole Street. As Cole
Street was a narrow one-way street and wider roadways existed two or
three blocks either north or south, LCA thought the interchange site
made little sense if the Commission held it had no interest in the Cole
Street corridor. Officially, the Cole Street Expressway was strictly a
city project-and the city did not have the funds.
LCA's interim solution to the increasingly tense and increasingly
nebulous highway question was to propose construction of a boulevard
which would at once serve to save the land for a future expressway
and still allow development to proceed along the projected right of
way.
F. The Land Use Proposals: Compromise
While footwork on the highway question was proceeding, PAC was
preparing its land use plan, which did not show the highway. The
City Plan director felt that his Commissioners would not accept the
site plans unless they included the projected expressway. On the after-
noon of the meeting with PAC to approve the plan, he insisted that
LCA place the highway on the map. LCA acquiesced and superim-
posed the highway corridor on the land use proposals. PAC members
had been unsatisfied with the extent of the proposed residential uses
in the compromise plan, but had been assuaged by the knowledge
that residential redevelopment was to receive priority and by the fact
78. Interview with Albert Nerviani, Nov. 14, 1968.
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that the highway had never been discussed in PAC meetings. With
the highway superimposed, however, the inevitable explosion followed
and the compromise plan was defeated at the meeting which had been
called to approve it.
The disastrous meeting prompted one of the first critical interven-
tions by the Mayor's office, heretofore one of the quietest agents in
the planning processes of both DeSoto-Carr and Model Cities. Noting
that PAC had to approve the DeSoto-Carr plans within weeks, if not
days, in order to get approval by the necessary city agencies and the
city Board of Aldermen so that DeSoto-Carr could be included in the
1969 NDP application, the Mayor's office let it be known it felt the
highway was very much in the future.7 9 The controversy over an un-
certain event to occur at an uncertain date in the future was held
to be threatening a more important goal. The fiat was to demap the
highway. The Mayor's word, however, could not alone accomplish
the demapping. HUD still required that urban renewal plans con-
form with highway proposals. HUD had, however, imposed NDP on
DeSoto-Carr in the project's Mid-Planning Conference. As HUD had
previously reserved a 10.5 million dollar allocation for De-Soto-Carr,
LCA was reluctant to adopt NDP. LCA surmised that it would need
more than that sum to complete the DeSoto-Carr project, which HUD
implied would not be forthcoming. If NDP were adopted, however,
LCA could use "credits" which the city had created by investing more
in other urban renewal projects in Saint Louis than the Federal gov-
ernment required. The credits would enable DeSoto-Carr to progress
without city expense. LCA reluctantly opted for NDP.60
The new device would seem quite appropriate for DeSoto-Carr. In
the long range, it will enable plans to be changed, if necessary, to bet-
ter reflect the effects of impending development in Laclede's Landing
to the east of the Model City program. More immediately, however, it
furnished the means to a compromise on the highway, if but only for
a time.
As DeSoto-Carr was now under NDP, LCA received HUD approval
of a deletion of the Cole Street corridor from the land use proposals
79. Although the Mayor was the head of the City Demonstration Agency, that
office exerted its influence through the City Plan Commission and LCA rather
than through Model Cities. These informal channels of influence had been used
before and grew not by design but by developments. Interview with Robert Duffe,
Assistant to the Mayor, Feb. 11, 1969.
80. Interview with Arthur Hessel, Mar. 11, 1969.
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and the Plan Commission received LCA assurance that it would not
sell any land in the projected highway right-of-way during its first
year operations. The highway problem was temporarily solved, but
in a manner unexplained to the residents. Undoubtedly, the highway
question will arise anew when the status of DeSoto-Carr is reviewed
yearly, as required under the NDP program.
Although the highway question was answered, the residents were
still unsatisfied with the residential uses. The preliminary LCA plan
which had been rejected had placed the local shop area on the north-
ern edge of the project. An industrial zone separated the eastern
public housing project from the population centers existing and pro-
jected to the west. PAC wanted the industrial and commercial zones
shifted, thereby strengthening the residentially oriented corridor run-
ning east-west. The new commercial district is, therefore, adjacent to
the southeast quadrant designated for expansion of the central busi-
ness district. The plan, as altered, was approved by the PAC and has
now won the approval of all of the city agencies involved as well as
the Board of Aldermen.
Comparatively, the final land use projections stress more the resi-
dents' desires than the interests or the needs of the larger community.
Without considering the relative merits of the outcome of the highway
questions, the land use designations, especially the local commercial
ones, are questionable. As stated, local commerce is now located just
north of the central business district uses. The economic effect of locat-
ing a neighborhood shop facility adjacent to an area designated for cen-
tral business district uses may well make the shop center site so expen-
sive as to prohibit its development. The LCA alternative, situated on
the northern border of the project and therefore closer to the centers of
population north and west, would seem to offer a better site with
which to attract users who would service the neighborhood.
Because of the nature of NDP and its yearly review, it is difficult
to assess whether the citizens have won a veto over the LCA or whether
the land use map represents something LCA was willing to compro-
mise in order to begin work on the project. It can be concluded, how-
ever, that citizens have had a much greater voice in planning DeSoto-
Carr than they had in past urban redevelopment projects. Whether
the end product will be more or less beneficial to the larger community
because of the citizen participation requirements under which the
urban renewal plan evolved remains to be seen.
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G. Effects Upon the Neighborhoods
After the land use proposals were approved and the project was ad-
vertised, LCA received fifteen redevelopment proposals. Of the fifteen,
five are small in scope and envision expansion of area businesses. The
other ten, ranging from a convention center to office buildings to
federally subsidized housing, are speculative. LCA staff is presently
studying the proposals and will shortly begin reviewing them with
PAC.
At least one of the speculative proposals will test the extent of
neighborhood participation. A group called the Carr Central Develop-
ment Association has submitted a 90,000,000 plan for four-fifths of
DeSoto-Carr. The most extensive proposal received, it proposes 1,079
dwelling units for large families as well as commercial, industrial and
institutional developments. Importantly, it is sponsored by the Carr
Central Corporation and, if approved in full, the plan would adversely
affect the viability of all of the other nine speculative proposals.81 As
one-half of PAC is from the Carr Central Corporation, PAC will be
judging its own plan against all the others. Some may and have called
such PAC review a conflict of interest; others foresee the collapse of
the DeSoto-Carr project. Still others, most notably residents of the
area, see no basic conflict if PAC sanctions the proposal. Regardless
of one's opinion on the Carr Central Association submission, the up-
coming review of its plan will necessarily define whether neighborhood
power is to become neighborhood control and whether the current
citizen guides are aiding the growth of successful urban renewal or
further impeding a rebuilding of the city.
81. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 6, 1969, § A, at 17, col. 1.
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